来源：财经会议圈

　　拆解史上最大IPO背后的本钱收割游戏

　　华盛顿的“拦路虎”

　　2026年6月11日，就在SpaceX距离厚爱登陆纳斯达克仅剩不到24小时之际，一封炸药味全齐的12页信函直抵好意思国证券来回委员会（SEC）。

　　发信东说念主不是别东说念主，恰是以“华尔街死敌”著称的民主党照顾员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）。她在信中措辞犀利地要求SEC：必须推迟SpaceX的IPO上市，这场“史上最大范围IPO”对投资者保护和阛阓竣工性组成了前所未有的恫吓。

　　沃伦在信中写下了一句振聋发聩的告戒：

“你们必须推迟该登记声明的奏效时候。SpaceX的IPO创造了一个新问题：它正在阁下主要的股市指数，将就数百万投资指数基金的平庸散户在别无选拔的情况下，被迫承担SpaceX的巨大风险。”

　　这话听起来逆耳，但细看SpaceX的上市联想，你会发现沃伦的担忧绝非杞东说念主忧天。

　　离谱的“一口价”

　　135好意思元的爱买不买

　　传统IPO的玩法，专家齐懂：投行先给一个价钱区间，比如100-120好意思元，然后证据阛阓认购情况最终订价，这叫“价钱发现”。

　　但SpaceX不玩这一套。

　　它平直甩出135好意思元/股的“一口价”，爱买不买。

　　这在华尔街历史上极为萧疏。一家公司估值高达1.75万亿-2万亿好意思元，却连最基本的阛阓博弈订价模范齐省了，摆明了即是“我说若干即是若干”。

　　更离谱的是散户分拨比例。

　　好意思股惯例IPO，散户份额时时只须5%-10%，绝大多数份额齐会留给耐久持有的机构基石投资者。但SpaceX反治其身，将30%的IPO份额分拨给散户，金额高达225亿好意思元。

　　外界无边吹捧这是“让利散户、分享红利”，但内行看门说念：

机构投资者追求耐久稳固、风险可控，是阛阓的压舱石；

散户受心扉、公论、偶像滤镜驱动，盲目跟风、追涨杀跌，波动率极高。

　　马斯克领有重大的粉丝群体，他们会自觉造势、无脑买入，短期强行推高股价。但后续只须出现任何负面舆情，即便公司基本面毫无变化，股价也会因为散户心扉垮塌而大幅跳水。

　　参考历史案例：Robinhood曾将35%新股份额分给散户，上市后被散户爆炒至85好意思元，热度褪去后半年暴跌至15好意思元，高位接盘散户全线深套。

　　SpaceX本次散户占比极高，畴昔势必复刻同款走势：短期心扉拉涨，耐久散户买单。

　　估值泡沫

　　市销率100倍的离奇乖癖

　　SpaceX的估值到底有多离谱？咱们来望望硬数据。

　　2025年，SpaceX全年营收187亿好意思元，估值却突破1.75万亿好意思元，市销率接近100倍。

　　作念个对比：

AI龙头Anthropic估值近万亿好意思元，市销率仅21倍；

OpenAI市销率也只须34倍；

这两家AI企业的营收增速，远高于SpaceX，估值倍数却远低于它。

　　对比之下就能发现，所谓的AI泡沫，和SpaceX的估值泡沫比较，根柢微不足道。

　　更夸张的是，招股书中宣称公司远期潜在阛阓范围（TAM）高达28.5万亿好意思元。这个数字是什么认识？远超中国全年20万亿级的GDP体量，完全脱离现实生意逻辑，老练夸张造势。

　　还有马斯克的薪酬解锁条件：授予其10亿股、价值约6000亿好意思元的股权，解锁要求包括：

　　公司市值突破7.5万亿好意思元；

　　完成火星侨民中枢布局；

　　在火星落地100万常住东说念主口。

　　这在职何感性投资者看来，齐是离奇乖癖。但这即是投行的基本功：用专科模子、海量数据、行业术语，把虚无缥缈的故事包装得逻辑自洽、看似可行。

　　“包子式”包装

　　用星链包裹xAI的本钱游戏

　　从一线ECM投行分析师的内行视角来看，SpaceX的估值逻辑本色上是一套“层层嵌套打包”模式：

　　用盈利稳固、现款流优质的星链业务，包裹事迹惨淡、无法孤苦上市的xAI业务，形成“优质资产兜底、劣质资产挂靠”的包子式结构。

　　来看2025年的真实财务数据：

星链部门：收入114亿好意思元，盈利72亿好意思元（独一优质资产）；

火箭辐射部门：收入41亿好意思元，失掉6.62亿好意思元；

xAI部门：收入13亿好意思元，失掉130亿好意思元（纯纯的责任）。

　　看似三大中枢业务协同发力，实则只须星链是中枢盈利资产，其余业务均为失掉责任。

　　这套打包模式还实现了“废料应用、税务套利”：xAI终年无间失掉，单独运营会导致多量税务抵扣额度作废。而通过全体打包上市，通盘失掉额度均可并入主体财报，正当抵扣利润、诽谤全体税负。

　　这即是华尔街的真实玩法：所谓的公允估值、专科模子，从来不是测算出来的，而是机构之间反复扯皮、博弈、和解出来的“阛阓协议数”。

　　纳斯达克的“司法特供”

　　被迫资金接盘局

　　为了确保上市获胜，这次IPO的联想可谓是呕悉心血，其中最争议的莫过于纳斯达克挑升为SpaceX修改司法。

　　司法修改内容：将纳入纳斯达克100指数的时候从3个月缩小至15天，而且是加权纳入（权重辞别理拉高3倍）。

　　这意味着什么？

　　好意思国有多量被迫指数基金、养老基金、401K退休金账户，会自动买入纳斯达克100因素股。也即是说，只须熬过15天，就不错用老庶民的待业金来给SpaceX接盘了。

　　据测算，仅被迫基金强制配置的资金就高达100-200亿好意思元。

　　注意的资金早已提前布局：提前廉价建仓，恭候指数纳入、被迫资金进场后高位套现。访佛散户狂热抢购、主动基金布局、中东热钱涌入，上市初期流通股稀缺，股价势必被暴力拉升，制造极致的获利效应。

　　这场狂欢的终极脚本，早已注定：

　　上市拉升后，马斯克、早期鼓励、中枢职工融会过新股增发、股票质押贷款等面貌无间套现（马斯克历来偏好质押套现，特斯拉时期亦是如斯）。里面利益方离场结束后，股价终将总结基本面，通盘浮亏、泡沫风险，一说念由后进场的机构和散户贯串。

　　而这些机构资金，本色亦然平庸东说念主的养老钱、答理钱。

　　星链业务遇瓶颈

　　对好意思军“破饱读万东说念主锤”

　　好多东说念主不知说念的是，星链业务还是涉及瓶颈，连带火箭辐射业务的畴昔订单也存疑。

　　来看数据：

2025年一季度，星链用户范围1030万，比客岁翻了一倍，但前一年但是翻了三倍的，增速昭着下滑；

更可怕的是增长是若何来的？平均每用户收入（ARPU）从2023年的99好意思元/月降到2024年的91好意思元，再降到2025年的80好意思元，到2025年一季度还是暴降至66好意思元。

　　完全是靠降价换量、打价钱战！

　　原因不难认知：淌若你住在纽约、东京、上海，根柢不会用星链。星链即是给偏远地区用的，但偏远地区之是以偏远，即是因为东说念主少。To C端增长见顶了。

　　那若何办？只可对军方加价。

　　前段时候好意思军在战场多量使用名为“卢卡斯”的一次性无东说念主机，内置星链终局。前列激战正酣，SpaceX倏地要求将收罗用度翻5倍，从原先的5000好意思元/月平直涨到25000好意思元/月。

　　原理是：你蓝本买的是“大地套餐”，履行用在飞行器上，就得按“飞行器套餐”付款。

　　成果服软的竟然是好意思军！媒体询查负责东说念主，他只说SpaceX依然是“厚实可靠的耐久互助伙伴”。

　　这件事充分说明：SpaceX还是具备对军方的议价智商，但这也暴自满其实体业务增长乏力的莫名现实。

　　沃伦的三大“地雷”指控

　　沃伦在致SEC的信中，详备列举了SpaceX在财务和处理上的三大“地雷”：

　　1． xAI收购案可能存在司帐作秀或估值误导

　　SpaceX收购马斯克另一家公司xAI的历程中，来回订价是否公允？是否存在通过关联来回滚动利益？这些问题齐需要SEC彻查。

　　2． 马斯克个东说念主利益与公司利益存在严重冲突

　　马斯克同期是SpaceX和xAI的大鼓励，两家公司之间的来回，本色上是“左手倒右手”。这种利益运送的风险，在IPO招股书中是否被充分败露？

　　3． 马斯克在公司里面领有我行我素的权力，短缺有用制衡

　　面前马斯克手执SpaceX 82%的投票权，意味着这家近2万亿估值的行业巨头，完全由他一东说念主掌控，莫得任何机构或鼓励或者制衡、打扰。

　　成也独创东说念主，险也独创东说念主。 畴前两年，马斯克稀奇烂醉AI和天际数据中心赛说念，这意味着畴昔很长一段时候，SpaceX将无间干预大齐本钱用于新业务研发和布局，重资产干预之下，政策特地、干预失败的风险极高。

　　本钱慌乱

　　为什么急着上市？

　　好多东说念主会问：SpaceX明明不错不消上市，为什么马斯克这样张皇？

　　谜底很肤浅：这不是企业发展需要，而是本钱的集体慌乱。

　　原因一：全球风投行业迎来数十年最严峻的退出危机

　　寰球经济论坛5月发布的最新数据自满：

现时全球未上市的独角兽企业中，20%已成立超15年，59%已成立超10年；

企业从种子轮到首轮退出的周期，比较2022年拉长了45%。

　　行业惯例司法里，风投基金对LP的情愿退出周期仅为10年。这意味着，超半数独角兽早已超出商定退出期限，多量风投资金耐久被套牢。

　　原因二：AI行业稀奇烧钱，融资窗口期良晌

　　OpenAI客岁失掉超80亿好意思元，Anthropic客岁失掉超30亿好意思元，且两家企业畴昔数年仍将无间大额烧钱。

　　业内无边觉得，AI行业泡沫已然存在，仅仅没东说念主能精确预判松懈时候。马斯克急于落地IPO，即是为了霸占高位窗口期，锁定万亿估值，提前回避后续阛阓下落风险。

　　原因三：霸占AI本钱红利的末班车

　　当下是全球阛阓对AI认识溢价最高、资金最狂热的阶段。SpaceX抢先完成IPO，或者率先吸干华尔街通盘AI+天际赛说念的增量资金。

　　高端本钱博弈向来朴素：先到先得、先上市先收割。

　　三个阶段：看清洗牌时刻

　　SpaceX上市必须看准三个阶段：

　　第一阶段：看上市今日能否不破发

　　淌若流通盘这个词这样小（仅开释5%股份）、承销团这样强、机构认购这样热还能破发，说明阛阓其实还是虚透了。

　　第二阶段：看上市后15到30天

　　能否得手纳入纳斯达克100指数，把筹码获胜交给被迫基金（待业金）。

　　第三阶段：看半年后大鼓励解禁

　　5%的流通比例意味着95%的股份在IPO时处于锁定状态。半年后（12月初），这些股份将肃清锁定。那些在几十亿、几百亿估值时入场的早期鼓励，将面对十几倍、几十倍以至上百倍的暴利退出契机。

　　那将是怎么的一场血流成河？

　　谁是最大的赢家？

　　这场顶级本钱盛宴里，收益圈层稀奇分化。

　　竟然的赢家只须三类：

　　持股42%的马斯克本东说念主——上市后钞票将突破万亿级，成为全球首位万亿财主；

　　共计持股10%-15%的公司中枢职工——早期入局，成本极低；

　　早期入局的风投契构与鼓励——终于比及退出时刻。

　　除此除外，21家承销投行是最大的隐形赢家。

　　本年投行行业无边低迷、降薪裁人，而SpaceX这一个超等名目，就能让通盘参与投行团队逾额盈利。后续还能无间解锁二级阛阓增发、可转债、并购来回、巨额来回、股票回购等无间业务，号称投行的“年度飞升名目”，一年顶往年五年收益。

　　而输家呢？

　　通盘脱离基本面的高估值狂欢，最终齐会总结均值。狂欢终结之后，永恒是后进场的平庸东说念主承担通盘风险。

　　历史的循环

　　运河狂热与天际泡沫

　　终末，让咱们用一个经典历史案例帮专家看懂本色。

　　19世纪全球掀翻运河狂热，苏伊士运河、巴拿马运河开凿前夜，无数法国中产豪恣募资入局。最终巴拿马运河公司1889年收歇，初代投资者尽数血本无归。

　　但运河最终获胜通航，透澈改写了全球贸易样式，造福了后续上百年的全球经济和无数行业。可初代的基建投资者，险些莫得吃到任何期间红利。

　　如今的SpaceX、追捧它的华尔街本钱，何尝不是当年的运河狂热？

　　我从不否定SpaceX的伟大，也不否定天际经济的星辰大海，但四肢平庸投资者，咱们一定要克制对个东说念主英杰主义的选藏、对科幻猖狂叙事的顺从。

　　沃伦的告戒，不该被刻薄

　　SpaceX是实体产业的颠覆者，却是本钱阛阓的收割者。

　　它用极致求实冲突了传统航天的暴利与僵化，却用极致本钱套路，打造了一场属于顶级圈层的泡沫盛宴。

　　伊丽莎白·沃伦的告戒，不该被刻薄。

　　SEC是否会在政事压力下叫停这场“本钱狂欢”？马斯克将如何反击这位“诤友羽”的狙击？周五的上市规划是否会突遭变数？

　　这一切，齐将在畴昔48小时内揭晓。

　　但岂论成果如何，平庸投资者齐应该记着一句话：

　　通盘脱离基本面的高估值狂欢，最终齐会总结均值。狂欢终结之后，永恒是后进场的平庸东说念主承担通盘风险。

　　这是一封好意思国照顾院银行、住房与城市事务委员会成员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）于2026年6月9日写给好意思国证券来回委员会（SEC）主席保罗·阿特金斯（Paul Atkins）的信函，要求SEC推迟SpaceX的IPO注册声明奏效。

　　以下是全文翻译：

　　好意思国照顾院银行、住房与城市事务委员会华盛顿特区 20510-6075

　　2026年6月9日

　　尊敬的保罗·阿特金斯主席： 好意思国证券来回委员会 东北F街100号 华盛顿特区 20549

　　阿特金斯主席：

　　我怀着稀奇温雅的面貌，就天际探索时间公司（Space Exploration Technologies Corp．，简称“SpaceX”）行将进行的初次公开募股（IPO）致函您。

　　据报说念，由埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）领有的航空航天和东说念主工智能公司SpaceX，规划在本月晚些时候以高达2万亿好意思元的估值向投资者召募高达750亿好意思元——这将使其成为“史上最大范围的股市首秀”。然而，这次IPO似乎对平庸投资者偏激退休储蓄组成紧要风险，同期为SpaceX里面东说念主士（包括特朗普政府高等官员）带来巨大利益。

　　与SpaceX公开募股讨论的风险源于该公司向证券来回委员会（“SEC”或“委员会”）提交的备案文献偏激他公开报说念中揭示的一系列问题：开首，SpaceX瞻望将以约100倍2025年营收的价钱刊行股票——这一估值倍数险些史无前例，需要投资者对AI和天际两个畛域的诸多假定抱以极大信心；其次，非传统的公司处理结构将使SpaceX首席施行官埃隆·马斯克领有前所未有的权力，而投资者获取的职权将远低于传统公开股票购买者时时享有的职权；第三，主要股指提供商正在改写司法，为SpaceX快速进入其指数——以及驱动数百万好意思国东说念主退休储蓄的投资基金——铺平说念路。

　　最终的成果可能是厄运性的：淌若SpaceX的估值崩溃，退休东说念主员和家庭的投资者账户将际遇损失，且对任何公司欠妥步履险些莫得追索权，而地球上最富足的东说念主则因短缺监管而变得愈加富足。SEC的中枢职责是保护投资者，惊奇公说念、有序和高效的阛阓。鉴于史上最大范围IPO对投资者保护和阛阓诚信组成的前所未有的恫吓，您必须推迟任何加快注册声明奏效的步履。

　　在允许公司向公众出售其股票之前，委员会必须谈判“寰球利益和投资者保护”。在此历程中，委员会不错审查公司的初步招股说明书，以“阐述其是否得当适用的司帐圭臬和联邦证券法律律例的败露要求”。仅SpaceX IPO的巨大范围，在平素情况下就足以讲解SEC进行仔细审查和关注投资者需求的合感性。但这些并非平素情况：诸多额外因素加重了担忧，并要求SEC经受行动以履行其投资者保护和阛阓诚信职责，即推迟注册声明的奏效。

　　SpaceX的估值与司帐

　　SpaceX股票的价值——岂论是当今照旧可预思的畴昔——似乎建树在一系列独到的投契性事件之上。据《金融时报》报说念，SpaceX面前的财务现象“对于筹商公司价值绝不消处”，部分原因是评估尚不存在的行径的固有挑战，但这些行径可能成为一家职责高尚（“将深远之光蔓延到星辰”）的公司增长的一部分。据晨星（Morningstar）的一份请问，SpaceX的价值可能不到其1.75万亿好意思元估值的一半。

　　事实上，“以《金融时报》此前报说念的1.75万亿好意思元估值筹商，SpaceX将成为好意思国股市第七大公司。然而，按每年190亿好意思元的营收名次，它仅位列第200位，与幸运符麦片制造商通用磨坊（General Mills）相配。”阛阓“从未有过对一只如斯投契却又如斯重大的股票进行订价的前例”，“最大的问题是，高达1.8万亿好意思元的估值能否在公开阛阓中无间”。部分问题在于准确评估SpaceX的高尚主义（包括天际旅行和星际居住）是不成能的。但这亦然该公司无间失掉和未能实现畴前主义的家具。因此，阛阓分析师对其主义估值背后的数学逻辑建议了质疑，称之为“特地的”、“烟幕弹式的司帐”和“竟然脱离现实的”。淌若该估值无法无间，选拔以高估值买入的投资者——或因投资于指数基金而被迫买入的投资者，而这些基金自己基于已修改司法以纳入SpaceX的指数——将为此付出代价。

　　此外，IPO的估值部分由SpaceX与xAI的2026年统一决定。由于埃隆·马斯克身处来回两边，“他亲身与我方谈判来回，我方设定相对估值，我方签署统一协议，我方完成来回，然后才文牍董事会和鼓励”。这让马斯克有契机将xAI的估值举高到高出其资产价值的水平——换句话说，片面决定我方来回的价值——并将其纳入行将进行的IPO。SEC应评估SpaceX与xAI之间（以及埃隆·马斯克限度的其他公司组成的竣工收罗）的来回和关系是否因不准确或误导性的司帐或估值而对投资者组成风险。鉴于开阔主动和被迫投资者将表现于SpaceX的风险之下，短缺基本面撑持的估值可能恫吓咱们本钱阛阓的竣工性和稳固性。

　　SpaceX-xAI统一是马斯克先生限度的不同生意实体之间一系列共同限度来回中的一例——激发了对于SpaceX畴昔规划与其限度的公司进行整合的任何疑问。举例，正如生意媒体推测的那样，淌若特斯拉（Tesla）和SpaceX统一，可能立即触发马斯克先生1万亿好意思元的特斯拉薪酬决策，因为限度权变更要求将取消此前解锁股票所需的事迹条件。将这些新的特斯拉股票转移为新的SpaceX股票可能对SpaceX鼓励产生紧要影响。淌若如实存在将特斯拉和SpaceX统一的规划，此类规划应向潜在投资者败露，因为它们应被视为对公司业务政策和公开募股后续价值具有紧要进攻性的事项。鉴于SpaceX的S-1备案文献未说起此类统一对SpaceX估值的影响——尽管它承认与马斯克先生其他企业的业务来回可能发生——SEC应在加快SpaceX注册声明奏效之前，对马斯克先生对于其开阔强盛企业通盘权结构的畴昔意图进行透澈走访。

　　IPO后的公司处理

　　IPO还激发担忧，因为SpaceX的IPO后公司处理结构侵蚀了基本的鼓励职权，并将性命关天的公司权力授予马斯克先生。公开来回公经理当付其鼓励负责。SpaceX的IPO将颠覆这一模式，鼓励提供数十亿好意思元的新本钱，却莫得任何对马斯克先生或公司指引层的问责圭表，因为公司“联接了超等投票权股票、强制仲裁、更严格的鼓励提案司法以及德克萨斯州公司法，将限度权赋予SpaceX首席施行官埃隆·马斯克和其他里面东说念主士。SpaceX还将结果投资者挑战照料层、在法庭告状以及强制召开代理权争夺的智商”。

　　正如最初的公司法学者所言，“即使是马斯克的选藏者，也应该对SpaceX的公司处理感到不安”。

　　SpaceX的初步招股说明书标明，公司将保管双重股权结构，马斯克先生持有的每一股股票的投票权是向公众发售的每一股股票的10倍。这种不对称性将掠夺鼓励对紧要公司决策（如收购、剥离或重组）的任何权力。正如公司招股说明书所承认的，“马斯克先生将或者限度需要鼓励批准的事项的成果”。此外，拟议的公司处理结构实质上掠夺了董事会的照料公司权力，使其无法革职首席施行官：“马斯克只可由B类鼓励多数投票免除董事长或首席施行官——而他个东说念主限度该股票类别93.6%的股份——履行上保证了他的职位。”正如《金融时报》社论版所言，“传统的处理制衡险些完全缺失……[马斯克]将对投票权和董事会领有险些不成挑战的限度权”。

　　问题愈加复杂的是，“在其他非典型安排中，SpaceX不规划让其董事会多数成员为孤苦董事”，包括“不使用孤苦董事委员会来决定高管薪酬，这是大多数公司的作念法”。马斯克的地位很可能因其在董事会中强盛一又友的存在而得到巩固，包括安东尼奥·格拉西亚斯（Antonio Gracias）和史蒂夫·尤尔韦森（Steve Jurvetson）。据报说念，格拉西亚斯先生和尤尔韦森先生与马斯克先生私情甚密，何况是GPS信号阛阓的竞争敌手。这激发了公司处理担忧，并存在违抗反把持法退却关联董事（即公司董事同期担任其竞争敌手董事会成员）的风险。

　　SpaceX还试图结果鼓励通过法院获取法律救助的途径。证据其S-1备案文献，SpaceX规划通过强制大多数鼓励诉讼进入仲裁模范，使马斯克免受法律风险——这是一个不公开且系统性地偏向公司利益的历程。进攻的是，仲裁将是联邦证券法下诉讼的独一选拔，因为德克萨斯州生意法院——SpaceX首选的法律争议审理地——对讨论联邦证券法莫得统率权，这与S-1中宣称该畛域法律“尚未笃定”的说法相背。诚然该要求最终可能无法施行，但SEC最近推翻了一项耐久态度，即IPO中的强制仲裁要求不得当“寰球利益和投资者保护”，这才使这种尝试成为可能。此外，“SpaceX选拔了一项要求，仅允许持有公司3%或以上股份的鼓励拿起所谓的‘派生’诉讼，代表公司告状董事会或首席施行官——就像在更利于鼓励的特拉华州，一位小投资者拿起的特斯拉薪酬投诉那样。淌若SpaceX达到预期的1.75万亿好意思元估值，告状的鼓励将需要至少525亿好意思元的股份。”SpaceX还运筹帷幄通过进步鼓励提案门槛来保护马斯克对公司的片面限度权，退却其大多数投资者强制在鼓励大会上进行投票。

　　马斯克先生对SpaceX的权力进程尤其令东说念主担忧，因为他的利益与SpaceX鼓励和投资者的利益之间不成幸免地会产生冲突。公司招股说明书也承认了这极少：在向SEC提交的更正文献中，SpaceX承认，“畴昔可能在咱们与马斯克先生偏激领有或关联的实体之间，处事务来回、潜在竞争行径或其他生意契机等方面产生利益冲突。在平素业务历程中，咱们与其中一些公司进行了各式来回。”它陆续写说念：“马斯克先生或其关联方可能往往了解到某些生意契机（如收购契机或时间发展），并可能将这些契机导向他们投资的其他企业，在这种情况下，[投资者]可能无法了解或无法追求此类契机。”招股说明书还详备说明了马斯克先生——四肢对SpaceX负有受托责任的公司董事——如何也可能领有与SpaceX竞争的其他公司的资产：

　　证据咱们的轨则，马斯克先生偏激关联方不受结果地领有与咱们平直或转折竞争的资产或从职业务，何况莫得义务幸免从事与咱们疏通或类似的业务行径或业务线，包括被视为与咱们竞争的业务行径或业务线，或与咱们的任何客户或供应商开展业务。此外，咱们畴前曾与马斯克先生关联的实体进行来回，畴昔也可能陆续如斯。咱们可能选拔此类来回，而非追求其他一些鼓励可能更可爱或可能比咱们选拔追求的契机更具升值性的契机。

　　SpaceX招股说明书的这些要求标明，其IPO将是史上范围最大的，也可能领有史上最被阁下的公司结构。淌若IPO以其现时格式获批，马斯克在SpaceX领有的独到且不受拘谨的权力将对投资者、阛阓和公众形成严重任忧。这次IPO最终为畴昔IPO缔造了危机的前例。

　　对被迫投资者和本钱阛阓的影响

　　对于SpaceX的估值和公司处理担忧，淌若其IPO注册声明的奏效被加快，将对阛阓诚信产生紧要担忧。对于挑选和选拔特定投资的投资者，他们至少或者幸免投资于从事风险或不公说念步履的公司。但SpaceX的IPO创造了一个新的担忧：主要股市指数正在被阁下，以迫使指数基金中的数百万投资者——这是一种时时成本较低、对散户投资者有蛊惑力的投资选拔——投资SpaceX，并在莫得选拔的情况底下临SpaceX的紧要风险。“分析师揣度，在纳入后的几个月内，标普500、纳斯达克100和罗素1000跟踪器将保守地强制买入150亿至300亿好意思元的SpaceX股票，更激进的流通股权重情景则会高得多”。

　　除上述公开来回股票向散户投资者的逾额分拨外，SpaceX的IPO还将使被迫和主动投资者齐面对紧要风险。

　　主要股指有一套明确的司法来笃定是否以及何时纳入新公司。这些司法为股票购买者提供了进攻的投资者保护，使其免受新上市IPO的波动性和不笃定性影响，并允许阛阓发现机制在指数纳入之前为公开公司建树公说念价钱。这些司法时时包括庄重度和可行性要求。举例，标普500要求公司在指数纳入前至少公开来回12个月，何况至少明白四个季度实现盈利。

　　但据报说念，SpaceX已游说指数提供商改动其指数纳入司法。指数提供商也照办了，进行了修改，使SpaceX等大型科技公司更容易被快速纳入被迫投资者的投资组合。4月，标普说念琼斯指数公司晓谕正在谈判修改司法，以便更容易让“超大市值”（MegaCap）公司——即股市中最大的公司——快速进入其指数。仅就标普500而言，该公司正在谈判的修改包括将圭臬的12个月IPO后恭候期缩小至6个月，取消圭臬的10%流通股权要求，并豁免超大市值公司孤高通盘其他公司齐需要孤高技艺得当履历的财务可行性圭臬。2026年6月4日，该公司晓谕吊销拟议的修改，声明“不应仅基于市值授予财务可行性、庄重度和IWF（可投资权重因子）要求的例外”。除标普说念琼斯指数外，尚无对于主要指数取销为SpaceX作念出的修改和例外的大范围报说念。2026年5月1日，纳斯达克100实施了一项新的“快速进入”司法，允许按市值名次前40的公司在上市第七天就有履历被纳入。富时罗素（FTSE Russell）也效仿了。正如《华尔街日报》报说念的那样，该公司“修改了司法，使新上市的大型公司更容易进入其好意思国指数，为被迫投资者快速获取SpaceX和其他备受注意的上市公司的股票打开了大门”。

　　指数提供商对新公开募股的不同处理面貌可能导致投资者对股票敞口的预期出现各别。此外，正如一位分析师告戒的那样，这些不停变化的政策“可能在‘被迫’指数之间形成权贵的报酬各别”。

　　对于投资于为SpaceX放宽司法的指数基金的投资者，这些修改可能导致他们被迫购买数十亿好意思元的SpaceX股票，而他们对此莫得任何发言权。倏地间，好意思国东说念主的退休储蓄或待业金可能与SpaceX的市值挂钩。股票的无边性将东说念主为推高其价值，而SpaceX里面东说念主士——收获于允许他们比往常更早出售股票的特殊司法——将或者速即抛售其股份，让散户投资者接盘。成果可能是巨大的钞票进取再分拨——即使SpaceX莫得盈利。简而言之，这些修改可能使一项金融工程规划得以实施，该规划阁下好意思国本钱阛阓以 favor 马斯克先生偏激盟友。正如一位《金融时报》批驳员所言，“为什么标普说念琼斯指数公司……似乎在 flirt with 一项放宽司法的修改，以允许埃隆·马斯克的卫星到AI公司快速进入？”这是SEC和指数提供商应该向公众回答的问题。

　　成心于SpaceX的修改不仅限于指数——大型资产照料公司也在作念出改动。2026年6月4日，照料着16.4万亿好意思元资产的富达投资（Fidelity Investments）“将其SpaceX IPO准入要求从高达50万好意思元大幅削减至仅2，000好意思元”，为历史上最大的股票首秀之一向数百万散户投资者翻开了大门。因此，SpaceX新IPO的风险不仅限于大型机构投资者，还将波及袖珍个东说念主投资者，因为这次IPO似乎短缺时时存在的许多投资者和阛阓保护。

　　在谈判SpaceX IPO对投资者的风险时，您还必须谈判到，这些风险将因SpaceX股票被纳入主要指数以及通过主要资产照料公司和投资照顾人向散户投资者敞开而立即被放大。这创造了一种情景：现时SpaceX鼓励——包括特朗普政府高等官员——不错在危及好意思国投资者和咱们金融稳固的同期使我方致富。

　　其他需要推迟奏效的问题

　　除对于SpaceX财务败露、公司处理以及阁下股市指数以利于自身的诸多担忧外，还有三个其他谈判因素需要推迟公司注册文献的奏效，并要求SEC进行透澈走访。开首，存在潜在证券法违纪的问题，即对于SpaceX开动私东说念主备案的显露。早在SpaceX于2026年4月1日向SEC提交守秘注册声明之前，新闻报说念就佩戴了对于招股说明书内容的信息，并激发了投资者酷爱酷爱。淌若这些显露是SpaceX为在IPO前加多阛阓酷爱酷爱而进行的和洽尝试的成果，可能组成证券法第5条的违纪，该要求退却“抢跑”（gun-jumping）——在提供注册声明之前出售或宣传股票。法律规则，“除非注册声明对某种证券已奏效，不然任何东说念主平直或转折……使用州际贸易或邮件的任何交通或通信技能或用具，通过任何招股说明书或其他面貌出售该证券，均属行恶。”由于SpaceX在职何注册声明之前就已受到对于上市的性命关天的公众关注，SEC应加强对SpaceX IPO策略的审查，以确保公司未违抗第5条。

　　其次，存在马斯克先生在X上发布对于公司的声明所激发的阛阓紊乱问题——X是他也领有的应酬媒体平台，当今属于SpaceX的xAI部门。一些金融记者觉得，这些声明与SpaceX公开备案文献中的业务信息存在实质性矛盾。岂论这些偏差是否紧要，马斯克先生以在X上凭一时兴起发布公开声明而著名，这些声明不错眨眼间撼动阛阓。他还以尽管未实现浩大的业务主义却结果大齐薪酬决策而著名。淌若这种步履模式无间下去，将对SpaceX的竟然度产生紧要怀疑，以偏激备案的IPO是否充分文牍投资者与马斯克先生讨论的风险。

　　对于证券法违纪和马斯克先生矛盾声明的担忧，足以让SEC推迟SpaceX注册声明的奏效，并允许阛阓有一段自若期，以更透澈地评估SpaceX IPO的合感性。

　　论断与问题

　　SpaceX的IPO似乎为鼓励和畴昔公开公司上市呈现了独到且始创前例的风险。公司的司帐和财务请问存在令东说念主不安的时弊，并被本年早些时候发生的大范围且不透明的xAI统一所粉饰。公司的公司处理结构将独到的权力授予其首席施行官，并严重结果鼓励职权。主要股指在吊销旧司法或制定新司法以允许SpaceX纳入方面的共谋，意味着数十亿好意思元的被迫投资将被迫进入该公司，使退休东说念主员和平庸投资者面对风险。

　　简而言之，投资者和公众对SpaceX偏激规划如何使用其寻求召募的数十亿好意思元存在开阔未解答的紧要问题。SEC不应在未经严格审查SpaceX财务报表、公司处理结构偏激可能对散户投资者（包括通过指数基金）的影响的情况下，加快SpaceX注册声明的奏效。

　　我要求您在2026年6月23日之前，对以下问题提供详备复兴：

　　SEC运筹帷幄如何评估SpaceX对于其估值的主张，基于其对天际旅行、多行星居住和“将深远之光蔓延到星辰”等主张？请包括对于以下方面的具体信息： a． 任何潜在的高估来源 b． SpaceX建议的估值（1.75万亿好意思元）与其营收（每年190亿好意思元）之间的各别

　　SEC确保投资者获取明晰准确败露的规划是什么，尽管存在复杂的司帐问题？请提供对于以下方面的具体信息： a． 近期xAI收购的估值 b． 连络独创东说念主下野的影响 c． SpaceX各子公司（包括辐射、星链和xAI）的营收和失掉，包括星链用户群的行业圭臬信息 d． 承销银行之间任何潜在的利益冲突 e． SpaceX审计师的严谨性和孤苦性，包括任何潜在的利益冲突 f． 任何可能对SpaceX股票价值产生紧要影响的预期畴昔统一或紧要来回

　　SEC是否定为，从守秘备案草案显露的信息已实质性加多了阛阓对SpaceX初次公开募股的酷爱酷爱？

　　鉴于有报说念称守秘备案草案的信息被欠妥显露，可能组成“抢跑”，SEC是否谈判过推迟SpaceX的初次公开募股？

　　SEC在评估IPO时，规划如何谈判SpaceX的公司结构——该结构将险些完全的限度权授予一个东说念主？请提供对于以下方面的具体信息： a． 其双重股权结构 b． 埃隆·马斯克对投票权的限度 c． 董事会成员的孤苦性，鉴于他们与控股鼓励马斯克先生的个东说念主和业务关系 d． SpaceX与马斯克先生限度的其他实体之间潜在的利益冲突来回

　　SEC规划如何保护被迫投资者免受SpaceX股票的风险，包括： a． 机构投资者（如养老基金），以及 b． 被迫指数基金的鼓励

　　SEC是否会寻求SpaceX对于州法院对《来回法》索赔统率权论断的法律依据？

　　此致

　　伊丽莎白·沃伦 银行、住房与城市事务委员会 资深成员（Ranking Member）

　　TIM SCOTT SOUTH CAROLINA， CHAIRMAN

　　ELIZABETH WARREN MASSACHUSETTS， RANKING MEMBER

　　MIKE CRAPO， IDAHO

　　JACK REED， RHODE ISLAND

　　MIKE ROUNDS， SOUTH DAKOTA

　　MARK R． WARNER， VIRGINIA

　　THOM TILLIS， NORTH CAROLINA

　　CHRIS VAN HOLLEN， MARYLAND

　　JOHN KENNEDY， LOUISIANA

　　CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO， NEVADA

　　BILL HAGERTY， TENNESSEE

　　TINA SMITH， MINNESOTA

　　CYNTHIA LUMMIS， WYOMING

　　RAPHAEL G． WARNOCK， GEORGIA

　　KATIE BOYD BRITT， ALABAMA

　　ANDY KIM， NEW JERSEY

　　PETE RICKETTS， NEBRASKA

　　RUBEN GALLEGO， ARIZONA

　　JIM BANKS， INDIANA

　　LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER， DELAWARE

　　KEVIN CRAMER， NORTH DAKOTA

　　ANGELA D． ALSOBROOKS， MARYLAND

　　BERNIE MORENO， OHIO

　　DAVID McCORMICK， PENNSYLVANIA

　　JANIE FAULKNER， STAFF DIRECTOR

　　JON DONENBERG， DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

　　United States SenateCOMMITTEE ON BANKING， HOUSING， AND URBAN AFFAIRSWASHINGTON， DC 20510-6075

　　June 9， 2026

　　The Honorable Paul Atkins

　　Chair

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission

　　100 F Street NE

　　Washington， DC 20549

　　Dear Chair Atkins，

　　I write with extreme concern regarding the upcoming initial public offering （IPO） of Space Exploration Technologies Corp． （“SpaceX”）． According to reports， SpaceX， an aerospace and artificial intelligence company owned by Elon Musk， seeks to target a valuation of upwards of $2 trillion and raise up to $75 billion from investors in its offering later this month – making it “the largest stock-market debut in history．” However， this IPO appears to present significant risks to ordinary investors and their retirement savings – while carrying enormous advantages for SpaceX insiders， including senior Trump Administration officials．

　　The risks associated with SpaceX‘s public offering are caused by a confluence of concerns revealed by the company’s filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission （“SEC，” or “the Commission”） and other public reporting： first， “SpaceX is expected to offer stock at roughly 100 times 2025 revenue — a valuation multiple with little precedent， and one that requires numerous leaps of faith around both the AI and space theses；” second， a non-traditional governance structure that will leave SpaceX‘s CEO， Elon Musk， with an unprecedented level of power， and investors with significantly fewer rights than those traditionally offered to purchasers of public shares； and third， major stock index providers rewriting their rules to fast track SpaceX’s entry into their indexes — and into the investment funds that power millions of Americans‘ retirement savings．

　　The net result could be disastrous： a scenario where retirees‘ and families’ investment accounts take a hit if SpaceX‘s valuation falters， with little recourse for any corporate misconduct， while the wealthiest man on earth becomes even wealthier due to a lack of oversight． The SEC’s core mission is to protect investors and maintain fair， orderly， and efficient markets． Given the unprecedented threats to investor protection and market integrity posed by the biggest IPO in history， you must delay any eventual acceleration of the registration statement‘s effectiveness accordingly． Before the company is allowed to go public， the SEC must investigate whether index funds and other financial entities involved in SpaceX’s IPO are adequately protecting investors， and the company must fill disclosure gaps related to valuation， ensure risks and details related to its concentrated governance structure are clear to investors， and abandon mandatory arbitration to provide shareholders whose rights are otherwise gutted in this structure a minimum avenue for recourse．

　　SpaceX‘s IPO Process and the SEC’s Role

　　SpaceX has been privately held since its founding by Elon Musk in 2002， raising approximately $9 billion in equity capital through private markets． Remaining private has allowed Mr． Musk to retain extensive control over the company． Mr． Musk， in addition to being the founder， serves as Chief Executive Officer， Chief Technology Officer， and Chairman of the Board， in addition to being the controlling shareholder． Earlier this year， SpaceX combined with another privately held company founded and controlled by Mr． Musk， xAI， in “the biggest merger in history．．． to create a $1.25 trillion giant．” SpaceX filed its IPO registration statement with the SEC on May 20， 2026， having reportedly filed a confidential registration around April 1， 2026． If the SpaceX IPO goes through at the target valuations， the “blockbuster listing will unlock vast new wealth for SpaceX executives and investors ．．． But all of the holdings pale in comparison to the riches that Musk will unlock． He holds [vested shares] which could be worth about $700bn． A successful listing could see him become the world‘s first trillionaire．”

　　Before allowing a company to sell its shares to the public， the Commission is required to consider “the public interest and the protection of investors．” In so doing， the Commission may review the company‘s preliminary prospectus “for compliance with the applicable accounting standards and the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws and regulations．” The massive size of the SpaceX IPO alone， under normal circumstances， would justify careful SEC review and attention to investor needs． But these are not normal circumstances： a number of additional factors exacerbate concerns and require action by the SEC to meet its investor protection and market integrity mandates by delaying the effectiveness of SpaceX’s registration statement．

　　SpaceX‘s Valuation and Accounting

　　The value of SpaceX shares – now and in the foreseeable future – appears to be based on a uniquely speculative series of events． According to the Financial Times， SpaceX‘s finances today “are of no use in working out what the company is worth，” in part because of the inherent challenge of valuing activities that don’t yet exist but could be part of the growth of a company whose lofty mission is to “extend the light of consciousness to the stars．” According to a report from Morningstar， SpaceX may be worth less than half of the $1.75 trillion valuation it seeks．

　　Indeed， “[a]t the valuation of $1.75tn previously reported by Financial Times， SpaceX would be the U.S． stock market‘s seventh-largest company． However， when ranked by its revenue of $19 billion a year， it would be 200th， on par with Lucky Charms cereal maker General Mills．” The market has “never before had to price a stock so speculative yet so large，” and “[t]he big question is whether a valuation as large as $1.8 trillion can be sustained in public markets．” Part of the problem is the impossibility of accurately valuing SpaceX’s lofty goals， including space travel and interplanetary habitation． But it is also the product of the company‘s consistent negative profitability， and on its failure to meet past goals． As a result， market analysts have raised concerns about the math underlying SpaceX’s target valuation， calling it “nonsensical，” “smoke-and-mirrors accounting，” and “truly out of this world．” If that valuation cannot be sustained， the investors who have chosen to buy in at lofty valuations – or will be forced to do so because of their investments in index funds， that are themselves based on indexes that have amended their rules to include SpaceX – will pay the price．

　　Additionally， the IPO‘s value is set in part by SpaceX’s 2026 merger with xAI． Since Elon Musk was on both sides of the transaction， “he negotiate[d] the deal with himself， set the relative valuations himself， sign[ed] the merger agreement， close[d] the deal， and then [told] the boards and shareholders about it．” This gave Mr． Musk an opportunity to inflate the valuation of xAI in excess of its assets – in other words， unilaterally deciding the value of his own transaction – and roll this into the upcoming IPO． The SEC should evaluate whether transactions and other relationships between SpaceX and xAI （as well as the full web of other companies under Elon Musk‘s control） present risks to investors from inaccurate or misleading accounting or valuation． Given the range of both active and passive investors who will be exposed to SpaceX’s risk， valuations that are not supported by fundamentals may threaten the integrity and stability of our capital markets．

　　The SpaceX-xAI merger is one in a series of common-control transactions between different business entities controlled by Mr． Musk – raising questions about any future plans SpaceX might have to integrate with Musk-controlled firms． For example， should Tesla and SpaceX merge as the business press has speculated， it could instantly trigger Mr． Musk‘s $1 trillion Tesla pay package due to a change in control provision that voids the performance conditions previously required to unlock the shares． Converting these new Tesla shares into new SpaceX shares could have significant implications for SpaceX shareholders． If plans do in fact exist to merge Tesla and SpaceX， such plans should be disclosed to prospective investors， as they should be considered materially important to the business strategy of the company and subsequent value of the public offering． Given that SpaceX’s S-1 makes no mention of the effect such a merger would have on SpaceX‘s valuation – even as it acknowledges that business transactions with Mr． Musk’s other ventures may occur – the SEC should conduct a thorough inquiry into Mr． Musk‘s future intentions regarding the ownership structure of his many powerful businesses before accelerating the effectiveness of SpaceX’s registration statement．

　　Post-IPO Corporate Governance

　　The IPO also poses concerns because SpaceX‘s post-IPO governance structure erodes fundamental shareholder rights and vests an extraordinary level of corporate power in Mr． Musk． Publicly traded companies are meant to be accountable to their shareholders． The SpaceX IPO will flip this model on its head， with shareholders providing billions of dollars in new capital with no accountability measures for Mr． Musk or company leadership， as the company “[combines] supervoting shares， mandatory arbitration， stricter rules on shareholder proposals and Texas corporate law to give control to SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and other insiders． SpaceX also will limit investors’ ability to challenge management， sue in court， and force proxy contests．”

　　As leading corporate law scholars put it， “even Musk admirers should be troubled by SpaceX‘s governance．”

　　SpaceX‘s preliminary prospectus indicates that the company will maintain a dual-class share structure， with each share held by Mr． Musk holding 10 times as much voting power as a share of the class offered to the public． Such asymmetry will deny shareholders any power over major corporate decisions like acquisitions， divestments， or restructuring． As the company’s prospectus admits， “Mr． Musk will be able to control the outcome of matters requiring shareholder approval．” In addition， the proposed governance structure essentially eliminates the Board of Directors‘ authority to manage the company，开云kaiyun(中国) stripping it of the ability to fire the Chief Executive Officer： “Musk can only be removed as chair or chief executive by a majority vote of the class B shareholders — and personally controls 93.6 per cent of the share class — in effect guaranteeing his position．” As the editorial board of the Financial Times put it， “[t]raditional governance checks are almost entirely absent．．．． [Musk] will have a virtually unchallengeable grip on voting rights and the board．”

　　Compounding the problem is that “among [other] atypical arrangements， SpaceX does not plan to have the majority of its board be independent directors，” including “not us[ing] a committee of independent board members to determine executive compensation， as most companies do．” Musk‘s position is likely to be entrenched by the presence of his powerful friends on the board of directors， including Antonio Gracias and Steve Jurvetson． Mr． Gracias and Mr． Jurvetson are reportedly personally close to Mr． Musk and competitors in the market for GPS signals． This raises corporate governance concerns， and runs the risk of violating antitrust laws banning interlocking directorates in which corporate directors sit on the boards of their competitors．

　　SpaceX is also attempting to limit shareholders‘ access to the courts for legal remedies． According to its S-1 filing， SpaceX plans to insulate Musk from legal risk by forcing most shareholders’ suits into arbitration， a process hidden from public view and systematically tilted in favor of the company‘s interests． Importantly， arbitration would be the only option for suits under federal securities law， because the Texas Business Court – SpaceX’s preferred forum for legal disputes – does not have jurisdiction over the relevant federal securities laws， contrary to the S-1‘s assertion that the law in this area is “unsettled．” While the provision may not ultimately be enforceable， such an attempt has been made possible by the SEC’s recent reversal of a longstanding position that forced arbitration clauses in IPOs were not in “the public interest and protection of investors．” Furthermore， “SpaceX has opted for a provision that allows only shareholders holding 3 per cent or more of a company‘s shares to bring a so-called ’derivative‘ lawsuit on behalf of the company suing the board or chief executive， like the Tesla pay complaint filed by a tiny investor in the more shareholder-hospitable Delaware． Should SpaceX hit its expected $1.75tn valuation， a suing shareholder would need a stake of at least $52.5bn．” SpaceX also intends to protect Musk’s unilateral control over the company by raising the threshold for shareholder proposals， prohibiting most of its investors from forcing a vote at a shareholder meeting．

　　The degree of Mr． Musk‘s power over SpaceX is especially concerning because of the conflicts that will inevitably arise between his interests and those of SpaceX’s shareholders and investors． The company‘s prospectus says as much： In its amended filing with the SEC， SpaceX admits that “[c]onflicts of interest could arise in the future between us， on the one hand， and Mr． Musk and entities owned by or affiliated with him， on the other hand， concerning among other things， business transactions， potential competitive activities or other business opportunities． In the normal course of business， we have engaged in a variety of transactions with some of these companies．” It continues： “Mr． Musk or his affiliates may become aware， from time to time， of certain business opportunities （such as acquisition opportunities or technological developments） and may direct such opportunities to other businesses in which they have invested， in which case [investors] may not become aware of or otherwise have the ability to pursue such opportunity．” The prospectus also details how Mr． Musk – a corporate director with fiduciary obligations to SpaceX – may also own assets in other companies that compete with SpaceX：

　　Under our charter， Mr． Musk and his affiliates are not restricted from owning assets or engaging in businesses that compete directly or indirectly with us and will not have any duty to refrain from engaging， directly or indirectly， in the same or similar business activities or lines of business as us， including those business activities or lines of business deemed to be competing with us， or doing business with any of our customers or vendors． Moreover， we have in the past entered into， and may in the future enter into， transactions with entities affiliated with Mr． Musk． We may enter into such transactions in lieu of pursuing other opportunities that some other shareholders may prefer or that may prove to be more accretive than the opportunities we elect to pursue．

　　These provisions of SpaceX‘s prospectus indicate that its IPO will be the biggest in history and may also have the most rigged corporate structure in history． Should the IPO be approved in its current form， the uniquely unchecked power Musk will have at SpaceX creates serious concerns for investors， markets， and the public at large． This IPO ultimately sets a dangerous precedent for future IPOs．

　　Effects on Passive Investors and the Capital Markets

　　The valuation and corporate governance concerns regarding SpaceX raise significant concerns about market integrity should its IPO‘s effectiveness be accelerated． For investors who pick and choose their specific investments， they at least are able to avoid investing in companies that engage in risky or unfair practices． But the SpaceX IPO creates a new concern： that major stock market indexes are being rigged in a way that would force millions of investors in passive index funds – a generally lower cost investment option that can be attractive to retail investors – to invest in SpaceX and face exposure to SpaceX’s significant risks with no choice in the matter． “Analysts estimate conservative forced buying of $15 billion to $30 billion across S&P 500， Nasdaq-100 and Russell 1000 trackers in the months after inclusion， with more aggressive float-weighted scenarios running far higher．”

　　In addition to the above-average allocation of publicly traded stocks to retail investors， SpaceX‘s IPO will expose both passive and active investors to significant risk．

　　Major stock indexes have a clear set of rules to determine whether and when to add new companies． These rules provide important investor protections for stock purchasers from the volatility and uncertainty of newly-public IPOs and allow market discovery to establish a fair price for public companies prior to index inclusion． The rules typically include seasoning and viability requirements． For example， the S&P 500 has required that companies be publicly traded for at least twelve months and have at least four quarters of positive income prior to index inclusion．

　　But SpaceX has reportedly lobbied index providers to change the rules for inclusion on their indices． And the index providers have complied， with changes that would make it easier for large technology companies like SpaceX to be fast-tracked into passive investors‘ portfolios． In April， S&P Dow Jones announced it was considering changes to its rules to more easily enable “MegaCap” companies – the largest companies on the stock market – to be fast-tracked onto its indexes． For the S&P 500 alone， the firm was considering changes that included reducing the standard 12-month post-IPO waiting period to six months， eliminating the standard 10 percent float requirements， and exempting MegaCap companies from the financial viability criteria that all other companies are expected to meet in order to qualify． On June 4， 2026， the company announced it was foregoing the proposed changes， stating that “exceptions to the financial viability， seasoning， and IWF （investable weight factor） requirements should not be granted solely based on market capitalization．” Other than S&P Dow Jones， there has not been reporting of major indexes reversing changes and exceptions to long-standing rules that will be made for SpaceX． On May 1， 2026， the Nasdaq 100 implemented a new “fast entry” rule， which would allow companies in the top 40 by market capitalization to be eligible for inclusion on their seventh day of trading． FTSE Russell has followed suit． As the Wall Street Journal reports， the firm “changed its rules to make it easier for freshly minted megacaps to enter its U.S． indexes， opening the door for passive investors to quickly access shares in SpaceX and other high-profile listings．”

　　A divergence among index providers‘ approaches to new public offerings may lead to different investor expectations around stock exposure． Additionally， as one analyst warned， these shifting policies “could create significant return dispersion [between] ’passive‘ indexes．”

　　For investors in index funds that do bend the rules for SpaceX， the changes may lead to the forced purchase of billions of dollars of SpaceX stock without them having any say in the matter． Suddenly， American retirement savings or pensions may be tied to SpaceX‘s market capitalization． The stock’s ubiquity would artificially jack up its value， and SpaceX insiders – thanks to special rules allowing them to sell their shares sooner than usual – would be able to quickly sell off their shares， leaving retail investors holding the bag． What results could be a massive upward redistribution of wealth – even should SpaceX not be profitable． In short， these changes may enable a scheme of financial engineering that rigs America‘s capital markets in favor of Mr． Musk and his allies． As one Financial Times commentator put it， “Why on earth is [S&P Dow Jones Indices]．．． seemingly flirting with a rule-bending change to allow Elon Musk’s satellites-to-AI company a quick entry？” This is a question the SEC and the index providers should answer for the public．

　　Changes benefitting SpaceX are not limited to indexes – they are also being made by large asset managers． On June 4， 2026， Fidelity Investments， a firm with $16.4 trillion in administered assets， “slashed its SpaceX IPO entry requirement from as much as $500，000 to just $2，000，” opening one of the biggest stock debuts in history to millions of retail investors． The risk from SpaceX‘s new IPO will therefore not be limited to large institutional investors， but also small individual investors as the IPO appears to lack many of the investor and market protections that are typically in place．

　　As you consider the risks to investors from SpaceX‘s IPO， you must also factor that such risks will be immediately magnified by the inclusion of SpaceX stock on the major indexes and its availability to retail investors through major asset managers and investment advisors． This creates a scenario where current SpaceX shareholders – including senior Trump Administration officials – can enrich themselves while endangering American investors and the stability of our financial markets．

　　Other Issues Warranting Delayed Effectiveness

　　In addition to the multitude of concerns regarding SpaceX‘s financial disclosures， corporate governance， and efforts to rig stock market indexes in its favor， three other considerations warrant delaying the effectiveness of the company’s registration documents and demand thorough investigation from the SEC． First， there is the matter of potential Securities Act violations in the form of leaks regarding SpaceX‘s initial private filing． Well before SpaceX’s confidential SEC registration statement was filed on April 1， 2026， news reports carried information about the contents of the prospectus and generated investor interest． If these leaks were the result of a coordinated attempt by SpaceX to increase market interest in advance of an IPO， it might constitute a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act， which prohibits “gun-jumping” – selling or publicizing shares before a registration statement has been provided． The law provides that “Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security， it shall be unlawful for any person， directly or indirectly ．．． to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise．” Because of the extraordinary publicity surrounding SpaceX going public in the advance of any registration statement， the SEC should increase scrutiny of SpaceX‘s IPO tactics to ensure that the company has not violated Section 5．

　　Second， there is the market confusion that has ensued from Mr． Musk making statements regarding the company on X – the social media platform he also owns， now under the xAI segment of SpaceX． It appears to some financial journalists that these statements materially contradict business information included in SpaceX‘s public filing． Whether or not the deviations are material， Mr． Musk is well-known to have a propensity to make public statements on X on whims that can instantly move markets． He is also known to cash out on large pay packages despite not meeting lofty business goals． If this pattern of behavior continues， it casts significant doubt on SpaceX’s credibility， and whether its IPO as filed sufficiently informs investors of the risks involved with Mr． Musk．

　　Concerns regarding a Securities Act violation and contradictory statements made by Mr． Musk give enough reason for the SEC to delay the effectiveness of SpaceX‘s registration， and allow the markets a cooling-off period to more thoroughly evaluate the soundness of SpaceX’s IPO．

　　Conclusion and Questions

　　The SpaceX IPO appears to present a unique and precedent-setting risk for shareholders and future public company offerings． The company‘s accounting and financial reports contain troubling gaps， and are clouded by the massive and opaque xAI merger that occurred earlier this year． The company’s corporate governance structure vests unique power in its CEO and severely limits shareholders‘ rights． And the complicity of major stock indices in waiving old rules or creating new ones to allow SpaceX’s inclusion means that billions of dollars of passive investments will be forced into the company， putting retirees and ordinary investors at risk．

　　In short， there are a multitude of unanswered material questions investors and the public have about SpaceX and what it is likely to do with the billions it seeks to raise． The SEC should not accelerate the effectiveness of SpaceX‘s registration without serious scrutiny of SpaceX’s financial statements， governance structure， and the impact it may have on retail investors， including through index funds．

　　I request detailed answers to the following questions no later than June 23， 2026：

　　How does the SEC intend to evaluate SpaceX‘s claims about its valuation on the basis of its claims regarding such things as space travel， multiplanetary habitation， and “extending the light of consciousness to the stars”？ Please include specific information about： a． Any potential sources of overvaluation b． The discrepancy between SpaceX’s proffered valuation （$1.75 trillion） and its revenues （$19 billion per year）

　　What is the SEC‘s plan to ensure investors receive clear and accurate disclosures despite complex accounting issues？ Please provide specific information about： a． The valuation of the recent xAI acquisition b． The impact of co-founder departures c． The revenues and losses of each of SpaceX’s subsidiaries， including Launch， Starlink， and xAI， including industry-standard information on Starlink‘s subscriber base d． Any potential conflicts of interest among underwriting banks e． The rigor and independence of SpaceX’s auditors， including any potential conflicts of interest f． Any intended future mergers or major transactions that could have a material effect on the value of SpaceX stock

　　Does the SEC believe that leaked information from the draft confidential filing has substantially increased market interest in SpaceX‘s initial public offering？

　　Has the SEC considered delaying SpaceX‘s initial public offering， given reports that information from the draft confidential filing was leaked improperly and could be considered “gun-jumping”？

　　How does the SEC plan to account for SpaceX‘s corporate structure， which vests nearly complete control in one person， in its evaluation of the IPO？ Please provide specific information about： a． Its dual-class share structure b． Elon Musk’s control of voting shares c． The independence of board members， given their personal and business relationships with Musk， the controlling shareholder d． Potential conflicted transactions between SpaceX and other entities Musk controls

　　What does the SEC plan to do to protect passive investors from the risks of SpaceX stock， including： a． Institutional investors （like pension funds）， and b． Stockholders of passive index funds

　　Will the SEC seek the legal basis for SpaceX‘s conclusion that the jurisdiction of state courts over Exchange Act claims is unsettled？

　　Sincerely，

　　[Signature]

　　Elizabeth Warren

　　Ranking Member

　　Committee on Banking， Housing， and Urban Affairs

　　Footnotes：

　　Bloomberg， “What to Know About the SpaceX IPO，” Anthony Hughes， May 29， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-29/what-to-know-about-the-spacex-ipo．

　　Bloomberg， “Trump Officials Held Millions of Dollars of SpaceX Ahead of IPO，” Annie Massa， Sophie Alexander， and Bill Allison， June 3， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-03/spacex-ipo-poised-to-enrich-trump-officials-who-hold-millions-in-stock．

　　Financial Times， “More takeaways from an S-1 for the ages，” Craig Coben， May 26， 2026．

　　Bloomberg， “SpaceX‘s Capital Needs Are Out of This World” Chris Bryant， June 3， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-06-03/spacex-ipo-elon-musk-capital-needs-are-out-of-this-world．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， https：//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026039276/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm．

　　New York Times， “The Numbers， and Questions， Behind Musk‘s Mega-Merger，” Andrew Ross Sorkin et al．， February 3， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/02/03/business/dealbook/spacex-xai-merger.html．

　　SpaceX， Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， May 20， 2026， https：//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026036936/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm．

　　Reuters， “SpaceX files for IPO， sources say， offering investors stake in Musk‘s space ambitions，” Echo Wang， Manya Saini， and Joey Roulette， April 1， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-registers-take-rocket-maker-public-blockbuster-ipo-bloomberg-news-reports-2026-04-01/．

　　Financial Times， “Inside SpaceX‘s audacious IPO plan，” Ryan McMorrow et al．， May 20， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/a59be3cf-eee2-4b10-9c86-b6e4dc0dbbdb？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　15 U.S.C． § 77h； 17 C.F.R． § 230.461（b）．

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， “Filing Review Process，” Sept． 27， 2019．

　　Financial Times， “How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，” May 21， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/58fcca43-9195-49e2-b1c3-0e3bfb0147cd？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　CNBC， “SpaceX is worth less than half of its $1.75 trillion IPO target， Morningstar says，” Joseph Wilkins， June 3， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/06/03/morningstar-spacex-ipo-target-price-nasdaq.html．

　　Financial Times， “How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，” May 21， 2026．

　　Id．

　　Bloomberg， “What to Know About the SpaceX IPO，” Anthony Hughes， May 29， 2026．

　　Fortune， “Top analyst has harsh words for SpaceX debut： ‘We recommend that investors avoid this IPO’，” Shawn Tully， May 29， 2026， https：//fortune.com/2026/05/29/spacex-ipo-should-i-buy-bear-case-david-trainer/．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/05/26/technology/spacex-elon-musk-pay-board-governance.html．

　　Financial Times， “How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，” May 21， 2026．

　　The Motley Fool， “Honestly， the SpaceX Prospectus Is Far Worse Than I Imagined，” Sean Williams， May 26， 2026， https：//www.fool.com/investing/2026/05/26/the-spacex-prospectus-is-far-worse-than-i-imagined/．

　　Fortune， “Top analyst has harsh words for SpaceX debut： ‘We recommend that investors avoid this IPO’，” Shawn Tully， May 29， 2026．

　　Bloomberg， “Musk‘s Moonshot Merger，” Matt Levine， February 3， 2026．

　　Forbes， “Elon Musk，” https：//www.forbes.com/profile/elon-musk/．

　　Fortune， “Elon Musk‘s SpaceX buys xAI in stunning deal valued at $1.25 trillion ahead of looming IPO，” Amanda Gerut， February 2， 2026， https：//fortune.com/2026/02/02/elon-musk-spacex-xai-ipo-trillion/．

　　Forbes， “Could Musk Merge SpaceX And Tesla？ Here‘s What Analysts—And Betting Markets—Say，” Ty Roush， May 27， 2026， https：//www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2026/05/27/could-musk-merge-spacex-and-tesla-heres-what-analysts-and-betting-markets-say/； CNBC， “Will Elon Musk eventually merge SpaceX with Tesla？ Speculation is building，” Ananya Chetia， May 21， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/21/will-elon-musk-eventually-merge-spacex-with-tesla-speculation-builds.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “SpaceX-Tesla Merger Could Trigger Elon Musk‘s $1 Trillion Pay Package： Report，” Badar Shaikh， June 2， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-tesla-merger-could-trigger-123106691.html．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 57．

　　Reuters， “The SpaceX IPO and the lost battle for shareholder rights，” Ross Kerber， May 13， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/spacex-ipo-lost-battle-shareholder-rights-rosskerber-2026-05-13/．

　　Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance， “Even Musk Admirers Should Be Troubled by SpaceX‘s Governance，” Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel， June 2， 2026， https：//corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/02/even-musk-admirers-should-be-troubled-by-spacexs-governance/．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 2．

　　Id．

　　Financial Times， “Inside SpaceX‘s audacious IPO plan，” Ryan McMorrow et al．， May 20， 2026．

　　Financial Times， Editorial， “To infinity and beyond， with the SpaceX IPO，” May 22， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/0e5ab16c-957e-44d6-aa16-fe23412ef6df？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026．

　　Wall Street Journal， “The Money and Drugs That Tie Elon Musk to Some Tesla Directors，” Kirsten Grind et al．， February 3， 2024， https：//www.wsj.com/tech/elon-musk-tesla-money-drugs-board-61af9ac4．

　　“XONA Space Systems — Powerful Precise GPS，” Steve Jurvetson， May 8， 2024， https：//steve.blog/2024/05/08/xona-space-systems-powerful-precise-gps/； PR Newswire， “Xona Raises $92M to Rebuild Satellite Navigation for a New Era，” June 26， 2025， https：//www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/xona-raises-92m-to-rebuild-satellite-navigation-for-a-new-era-302491586.html； PC Magazine， “SpaceX to FCC： We Can Supply a GPS Alternative Through Starlink，” Michael Kan， May 14， 2025， https：//www.pcmag.com/news/spacex-to-fcc-we-can-supply-a-gps-alternative-through-starlink．

　　15 U.S.C． § 19．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， pp． 63-64．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026； Capital Forum， “Transcript of Conference Call on Forced Arbitration and Corporate Power in the Courts with Brendan Ballou，” May 12， 2026， https：//thecapitolforum.com/resource/transcript-of-conference-call-on-forced-arbitration-and-corporate-power-in-the-courts-with-brendan-ballou/．

　　15 U.S.C． § 78aa （giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934）．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 63．

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， “Sunshine Act Notice，” September 10， 2025， https：//www.sec.gov/newsroom/meetings-events/sunshine-act-notice-open-meeting-091725．

　　Financial Times， “SpaceX to drive a Cybertruck through corporate governance norms，” Sujeet Indap， May 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/7f34d58b-da81-4778-bca1-7aa89b08afca？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　Reuters， “The SpaceX IPO and the lost battle for shareholder rights，” Ross Kerber， May 13， 2026； TradingKey， “SpaceX IPO： Musk Controls 85.1% Voting Power， Shareholders Waive Jury Trials and Class Actions，” Jay Qian， May 21， 2026， https：//www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/261919584-elonmusk-spacex-ipo-tradingkey．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 57．

　　Id．

　　Id．

　　Social Science Research Network， “The Growth and Consequences of Index Investing，” Anne-Florence Allard et al．， January 12， 2026， https：//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm？abstract_id=6056574．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “SpaceX IPO could hit popular index funds — and your 401（k） — in as little as 5 trading days as indexes relax their rules，” Rudro Chakrabarti， June 1， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-ipo-could-hit-popular-101500534.html．

　　Id．

　　Bloomberg， “Index Funds Can‘t Say No to SpaceX，” Matt Levine， May 26， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/opinion/newsletters/2026-05-26/index-funds-can-t-say-no-to-spacex； Financial Times， “Et tu， S&P 500？，” March 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/59adbe42-ca30-47f3-9cda-5415945e9368．

　　Business Insider， “Here‘s when SpaceX could show up in major indexes and popular ETFs after its IPO，” Naomi Buchanan， May 24， 2026， https：//www.businessinsider.com/spacex-ipo-index-investing-etfs-spy-vti-qqq-spcx-stock-2026-5； CNBC， “Elon Musk’s SpaceX weighs Nasdaq listing after seeking early index entry， Reuters sources say，” March 10， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/03/10/elon-musks-spacex-weighs-nasdaq-listing-after-seeking-early-index-entry.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “Elon Musk‘s SpaceX Could Be Fast-Tracked Into S&P 500 After IPO Under Proposed Rule Changes，” Badir Shaikh， May 2， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/elon-musks-spacex-could-fast-180121306.html．

　　Bloomberg， “Index Funds Can‘t Say No to SpaceX，” Matt Levine， May 26， 2026．

　　Id．

　　S&P Dow Jones Indices， “S&P Dow Jones Indices Consultation on Treatment of MegaCap Companies，” press release， April 30， 2026， https：//www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/indexnews/announcements/20260430-1483123/1483123_spdji-us-indices-megacaps-consult-20260430.pdf．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “SpaceX Faces Delay to S&P 500 Inclusion After Index Provider Keeps Existing Criteria （SPCX），” Fiona Craig， June 5， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-faces-delay-p-500-100109864.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “Buckle Up， S&P 500 and Nasdaq Index Fund Investors． SpaceX Could Soon Become 1 of Your Largest Positions，” Daniel Foelber， May 31， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/buckle-p-500-nasdaq-index-162000546.html．

　　FTSE Russell， “Consultation for the Russell US Equity Indexes on the timing of IPOs and the treatment of companies with a high free float market capitalization，” February 2026．

　　Wall Street Journal， “FTSE Russell Latest to Make U.S． Index Inclusion Easier Ahead of SpaceX IPO，” Joe Stonor， May 27， 2026， https：//www.wsj.com/finance/stocks/ftse-russell-latest-to-make-u-s-index-inclusion-easier-ahead-of-spacex-ipo-35157adf．

　　Post on X by Eric Balchunas， June 4， 2026， https：//x.com/EricBalchunas/status/2062647912065044532？s=20．

　　CNBC， “SpaceX insiders will get to sell shares earlier than usual after the IPO，” Leslie Picker， May 21， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/21/spacex-insiders-will-get-to-sell-shares-earlier-than-usual-after-the-ipo.html．

　　Financial Times， “Et tu， S&P 500？，” Robin Wigglesworth， March 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/59adbe42-ca30-47f3-9cda-5415945e9368．

　　RIABiz， “Fidelity soars to $16.4 trillion of assets， a 16% jump of $2.3 trillion for 12 months， and widens gap on BlackRock and Schwab，” Brooke Southall， August 14， 2025， https：//riabiz.com/a/2025/8/15/fidelity-soars-to-164-trillion-of-assets-a-16-jump-of-23-trillion-for-12-months-and-widens-gap-on-blackrock-and-schwab．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “Fidelity Cuts SpaceX IPO Eligibility by 99%， But 5 Rules Could Cost You Access，” Lockridge Okoth， June 4， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/fidelity-cuts-spacex-ipo-eligibility-183319186.html．

　　Bloomberg， “Trump Officials Held Millions of Dollars of SpaceX Ahead of IPO，” Annie Massa， Sophie Alexander， and Bill Allison， June 3， 2026．

　　New York Times， “SpaceX Files to Go Public， Setting Stage for Huge I.P.O．，” Ryan Mac， Lauren Hirsch， and Maureen Farrell， April 1， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/04/01/technology/spacex-ipo-elon-musk.html．

　　See， e.g．， Reuters， “Exclusive： Elon Musk‘s SpaceX weighs Nasdaq listing after seeking early index entry， sources say，” Anirban Sen and Echo Wang， March 10， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/finance/elon-musks-spacex-weighs-nasdaq-listing-after-seeking-early-index-entry-sources-2026-03-10/； Reuters， “Exclusive： Musk rewrites IPO playbook with large slice of SpaceX stock for retail investors， source says，” Echo Wang， Milana Vinn， and Sabrina Valle， March 26， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/finance/musk-rewrites-ipo-playbook-with-large-slice-spacex-stock-retail-investors-source-2026-03-26/．

　　Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute， “Gun Jumping，” https：//www.law.cornell.edu/wex/gun_jumping．

　　15 U.S.C． § 77e； 17 C.F.R． § 230.135．

　　Forbes， “Elon Musk‘s xAI Buys X — Here’s What That Means For You，” Kate O‘Flaherty， March 31， 2025， https：//www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2025/03/31/elon-musks-xai-buys-x-heres-what-that-means-for-you/．

　　CNBC， “SpaceX skeptics have added reason for concern after Musk comments diverge from IPO filing，” Lora Kolodny， May 29， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/29/spacex-skeptics-concerned-as-musk-comments-diverge-from-ipo-filing.html．

　　CNBC， “Elon Musk‘s tweets are moving markets — and some investors are worried，” Sam Shead， January 29， 2021．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026．

责任剪辑：石秀珍 SF183开云kaiyun(中国)